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A B S T R A C T   
Psychologists have long since recognized that consumers have limited cognitive ability, and that this prevents 
them from weighing up all product attributes when making a choice. More recently, a new framework for 
consumer choice has been developed which takes account of this, by assuming that consumers are drawn to 
salient features of a product. We apply the framework of salient thinking to a simple transport market in which 
passengers may attach different weights to the utility of the trip (its comfort and/or duration) and the fare. We 
find the optimal fare structure in this market, and investigate under which conditions operators use their pricing 
schedule to focus passengers’ attention on fare, and when they direct attention towards trip duration or comfort. 
Furthermore, we address the quality investments made by operators compared to a rational benchmark. Quality 
enhancement in this model is increasing in the unit cost of providing the service. We finally discuss the impli-
cations of the theory of consumer choice, and the competitive model for transport markets compared to the 
predictions of a rational model. This leads to several testable situations which could give implications for policy 
makers and transport firms.   
1. Introduction 
The liberalisation of transport markets in many industrialised 
countries has led to an increasing interest in the strategic interactions of 
transport operators. Results from fare calculation and quality provision 
for monopoly (e.g. Jørgensen & Pedersen, 2004; Jørgensen & Preston, 
2007; Li, Lam, Wong, & Sumalee, 2012) have been extended to the 
oligopoly case of few providers of transport services.1 Pedersen (1999) 
presents an early theoretical model, and Clark, Jørgensen, and Mathisen 
(2011) analyse the connections between trip length and fare under 
different competitive regimes for horizontally differentiated transport 
services. A common premise in these analyses is that the outcome of 
consumers’ utility maximization – which belies the demand function for 
the transport service – is such that they trade off different goods at 
consistent rates (see Singh and Vives (1984) for the case of horizontally 
differentiated products). In a laboratory experiment, Tversky and Kah-
neman (1981) find that the rates at which consumers trade off time and 
money is context-dependent, violating the assumption common for the 
analysis of transport markets. Since both time (journey length) and 
money (fare) are important for passengers, this paper looks at how 
transport operators set their fares and quality level given that passengers 
allow relative comparisons to influence their decisions.2 
In a famous experiment, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) find that 
most of their subjects are willing to drive 20 minutes to save 5$ on a 15$ 
item, but are not willing to drive the same amount of time to save 5$ on 
an item costing 125$. The postulate of rational utility maximizing 
consumers is thus challenged since these subjects value money less when 
they consider high values. A rational consumer with a utility function 
which is linear in money should value the 5$ saving the same, inde-
pendent of the item purchased; a rational consumer with a concave 
utility of money would prefer to save 5$ on the higher valued item. The 
subjects in the experiments are influenced by relative comparisons, not 
just absolute ones. In the context of transport, Azar (2011) reports re-
sults from an experiment in which subjects are asked how much more 
fare they are willing to pay for a flight leaving at 10am as compared to 
7am. Since the value of 3 hours of sleep is independent of the price of the 
flight, the extra willingness to pay by a rational consumer for the later 
flight should not depend on the fare. However, subjects are willing to 
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pay more for their preferred flight, the higher is the fare for that flight. 
The airline should then have some scope for charging a premium rate for 
the flight that is perceived as higher quality if passengers make relative 
comparisons. 
Quality is a dimension that reasonably affects the demand for 
transport services and that will affect the fare calculations and/or the 
level of quality delivered by providers of services. Jørgensen and Solvoll 
(2018) and dell’Olio, Ibeas, and Cecin (2011) look at optimal quality 
provision when fares are set exogenously, and Jansson (1993), Panzar 
(1979) and Clark, Jørgensen, and Mathisen (2019) allow fares and 
quality levels to be determined endogenously.3 
By departing from the postulate of rationality, the current analysis 
views quality and fare of a transport service as attributes that providers 
may want to stand out in some way in order to influence passengers’ 
purchase decisions.4 Psychologists have long since recognized that 
consumers have limited cognitive ability, and that this prevents them 
from weighing up all product attributes when making a choice.5 
McFadden (1999; p. 74) notes that “Choice behaviour can be charac-
terized by a decision process, which is informed by perceptions and 
beliefs based on available information, and influenced by affect, atti-
tudes, motives and preferences”. Furthermore, the standard economic 
model implies that decision makers use information in an optimal 
manner, they have consistent and immutable preferences and the 
cognitive process simply involves preference maximization. In fact, 
McFadden (1999) accepts that decision makers can use heuristics that 
can fail to maximize preferences. There is some evidence that this 
thinking is also prevalent in the transport industry. In her report for 
Amadeus, Dykins (2017) looks at the consequences for airlines that 
customers have limited capacity for making choices, making “rational 
enough” decisions, noting also that upgrade service provider Seatfrog 
uses behavioural research on passengers to determine the value of 
upgrades. 
Immarsat aviation, a provider of Wi-Fi systems for aircrafts, also 
considers the fact that passengers make choices that are based on heu-
ristics, and not necessarily rational, explaining how this can be exploited 
to create value for airlines.6 One idea reported is based upon a result 
from Simonson and Tversky (1992) and involves the context in which 
decisions are made. Subjects were asked to choose between two brands 
of microwave oven, A and the cheaper model B, and a more expensive 
version of A denoted A’. They found that the proportion choosing A 
increased when the choice set was {A0, A, B} compared to when the 
participants could just choose between A and B. Immarsat aviation ap-
plies this to an airline considering the provision and pricing of its Wi-Fi 
service on board. By offering three levels of service, basic at €3, medium 
at €7 and high at €12, a large proportion of customers will “upgrade” 
from basic to medium. Giving the choice between basic and high would 
probably result in many customers paying €3 for the Wi-Fi service. Ac-
cording to McFadden (1999; p. 86), “… the inconsistencies that con-
sumers show arise because the context alters the saliency of available 
information” (italics in original).7 It is probably no coincidence that a 
low-cost airline like Norwegian has three levels of Wi-Fi provision on its 
737–800 models.8 In salience theory, firms can use decoy goods to focus 
consumers’ attention on the “correct” attribute (see Herweg, Müller, & 
Weinschenk, 2018). 
In departing from the strict confines of rationality, one opens up the 
black-box of decision making. In psychology, cognitive frames create 
simplified models of choices, by focusing attention on a narrow content 
of the perceived attributes of the choice. A cognitive frame can thus 
create expectations about the price or quality of a good, and this can be 
influenced by the information momentarily on offer to the consumer 
(Houdek, 2016). Faced with much information, and many choices, a 
consumer may first decide which options to consider, and then which of 
these to choose. Hence, a seller must alert consumers of its product in 
some way before it can be chosen, i.e. it must draw the consumers’ 
attention. In their analysis of stock purchases, Barber and Odean (2007, 
p. 785) state: “Attention is a scarce resource. [ ……] options that attract 
attention are more likely to be considered, hence more likely to be 
chosen”. A good example from the transport sector is low-cost airlines 
promoting a no-frills service, wanting passengers to focus attention on 
the low fare. In the World Airline Awards for 2018, Air Asia was voted 
the top best low-cost airline9; the web page of Air Asia proclaims “You’re 
going to love our deals. Get low fares to over 140 destinations”.10 Its 
Skytrax quality rating is three stars (out of a maximum five), denoting an 
industry average of acceptable product and service standards.11 No 
low-cost airline achieves the five star quality rating; ten full-service 
airlines currently have this rating, eight of these are based in Asia, one 
in Europe and one in the Middle East. One of the current advertising 
slogans of Qatar Airways is “Experience a journey like never before” 
which is designed to draw passengers’ attention to the quality of 
journey, not the fare. Airlines and transport operators in general can 
hence try to set fare and/or quality in order to influence the purchase 
decisions of passengers. The attribute to which a consumer’s attention is 
drawn is referred to as “salient”, and is given disproportional weight in 
the decision making process (Taylor & Thompson, 1982). Salience is one 
of the dimensions considered in the overview by Metcalfe and Dolan 
(2012) of how behavioral economics in general may affect research in 
the field of transport; this is also part of the policy of the UK Department 
for Transport in their “Behavioral Insights Toolkit” (DfT, 2011). 
Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) have developed a formal 
model of how consumers make choices when an attribute is salient to the 
decision, and Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2016) extend this to a 
competitive setting in which duopolists make decisions about price and 
product quality. It is this latter model that we utilize here to analyse 
competition between transport operators who attempt to draw passen-
gers’ attention to the attribute in which they have an advantage. We 
make a modest extension to the model by introducing an initial journey 
value (net of time costs) that can then be augmented by operators’ 
quality choices. Not only do operators need to make their decisions to 
maximize profits given the strategic response of the rival, they must also 
ensure that passengers focus attention on the “correct” attribute. By 
reducing fare, a low-cost carrier may be able to make passengers focus 
on that attribute even though the rival is offering greater quality; a high 
quality carrier may consider lowering its price towards the rival in order 
that its low fare does not attract attention, focusing rather on the higher 
quality.12 We investigate the consequences of this line of thinking for 
both the fare and the quality level, and compare with the rational 
3 Quality has many dimensions in practice such as frequency or capacity (De 
Borger & Van Dender, 2006) or congestion (Wan & Zhang, 2013; Wu, Yin, & 
Yang, 2011).  
4 Another departure from rational decision making by transport passengers 
has been analyzed by Avineri (2004) for decisions made under uncertainty.  
5 G€arling (1998) discusses the limitations of the rational model for modeling 
travel-choice decisions.  
6 See https://www.inmarsataviation.com/en/benefits/passenger-experience 
/connecting-with-passenger-preferences.html.  
7 Avoiding extreme options may also be familiar to customers choosing wine 
in a restaurant, where the most popular choice is often the second cheapest 
bottle (McFadden, 1999, p. 98).  
8 See https://www.norwegian.com/uk/travel-info/on-board/wifi/. 
9 See https://www.worldairlineawards.com/worlds-best-low-cost-airlines- 
2018/.  
10 See https://www.airasia.com/en/gb.  
11 Details of the ranking system can be found at https://skytraxratings.com/a 
bout-airline-rating.  
12 This reasoning has a link to the signaling literature which derives from 
Spence (1974; 1973) and asks, under what conditions, in a competitive 
marketplace, sellers of above-average quality products will signal this fact by 
taking some costly action. According to this literature, signaling costs differ-
entials represent a competitive advantage for high-quality firms. 
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outcome in which salience is not a feature of decision making. We show 
also that the higher the initial net journey value is, the lower will be the 
quality augmentation chosen by the operators. 
We apply a two stage model. In the first stage of competition, op-
erators decide which level of quality to provide at a cost, and then in the 
second stage they set fares, taking quality as given. We show that the 
type of equilibrium achieved depends upon the unit cost of provision of 
the service and the initial level of journey utility. When unit cost is low, 
the equilibrium is such that quality is undersupplied relative to the 
rational level, and operators compete by setting low fares (fare-salient 
equilibrium); for high unit costs of provision, operators oversupply 
quality in order to make passengers focus on this attribute since the fare 
must be high to cover costs (quality-salient equilibrium). Knowledge 
about these market relationships is relevant both for the operators 
competing in the market and the authorities intervening the market to 
achieve the overall objectives. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework 
for consumer decisions based on salient thinking developed by Bordalo 
et al. (2013; 2016) to a transport market. Section 3 shows how fares are 
determined in a simple transport market where customers are salient 
thinkers Investment in quality is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 ex-
tends the model to the case of continuous demand, showing that the 
preceding analysis is robust. Implications for transport markets are 
contained in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Salient preferences 
Here we adapt the model of Bordalo et al. (2016) to a transport 
market. There are two operators, and each provides a different version of 
a transport service; the service is characterized by an exogenously given 
journey time ðtiÞ, and an exogenously given production cost ðciÞ. The 
value to a passenger of undertaking a journey with carrier i ¼ 1; 2 is ϕi, 
and can reflect the fact that a journey gives both goal and process utility 
as in the literature on cognitive psychology (G€arling, Axhausen, & 
Brydsten, 1996). As is common in transport models, the passenger en-
dures a generalized cost of the journey (Gi) which consists of the fare 
paid (Pi) and the time cost (ti): Gi ¼ Pi þ ti (see e.g. Button, 2010). The 
time cost may itself depend upon factors such as trip distance, fre-
quency, check-in procedures and other quality factors. Denote vi ¼ ϕi  ti 
as the net value to the passenger derived from undertaking the journey 
with operator i. The utility of a rational passenger (RÞ from travelling 
with operator i is given by 
URðvi;PiÞ¼ vi   Pi: (1) 
The rational passenger is characterized by attaching the same weight 
to the net journey value and fare in (1), whilst a salient thinking pas-
senger will give different weights to the components in (1) depending on 
whether net journey value or fare is the salient attribute. Bordalo et al. 
(2013; 2016) use a salience function to measure the relative importance 
of each element in the utility function; in essence, the characteristic that 
is salient is the one which is further away from a reference point since 
this is the one that will grab attention. It is natural to think of the average 
net journey value and average fare as a reference point: v ¼ v1þv22 ; P ¼
P1þP2
2 . The salience function σðx; yÞ satisfies two main properties: 
ordering and homogeneity of degree zero. Ordering states that the 
salience of a characteristic is lower in a small interval than a larger one: 
for an interval ½x; y� that is contained in a larger interval ½x’; y’� we have 
that σðx; yÞ < σðx’; y’Þ. Homogeneity of degree zero implies that 
σðαx; αyÞ ¼ σðx; yÞ for α > 0, which means that the salience of an attri-
bute is independent of its unit of measurement. A salience function that 
satisfies ordering and homogeneity of degree zero implies also dimin-
ishing sensitivity in the sense that the same distance to the average gives 
lower salience at higher levels of the attribute.13 
The salience of net journey value for operator i is given by σðvi; vÞ, 
and the salience of fare by σðPi;PÞ; fare (net journey value) is salient if 
σðPi; PÞ > ð<Þσðvi; vÞ. Furthermore, Bordalo et al. (2016) impose sym-
metry on the salience function in order to give tractability in a model of 
competition with salient thinkers: σða1; aÞ ¼ σða2; aÞ; a ¼ fv; pg. This 
means that any attribute is equally salient for both services. Bordalo, 
Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) give the following example of a sym-
metric salience function that satisfies ordering and homogeneity of de-
gree zero: σða;aÞ ¼ ja  aja . Here salience is measured as the proportional 
difference from the average value of an attribute. This is illustrated in 
Fig. 1, which also demonstrates the ordering property. 
For δ 2 ½0; 1�, the utility of a salient thinking passenger ðSÞ from 





vi   δPi if σðvi; vÞ > σðPi;PÞ
δvi   Pi if σðvi; vÞ < σðPi;PÞ
vi   Pi if σðvi; vÞ ¼ σðPi;PÞ
(2)  
When δ ¼ 1 preferences coincide with (1), but otherwise the passenger 
places most weight on the attribute that he regards as salient. In the first 
line of equation (2), the salience function is largest for net journey value, 
implying that this is further from the average than operator i’s fare. 
Hence, net journey value is salient, and passengers place more weight on 
this attribute in their utility function than on fare. In the second line of 
(2), fare is the salient attribute, and the passenger places less weight on 
net journey value in making a decision. The final line in (2) depicts the 
case in which net journey value and fare are equally salient which gives 
the same utility function as in (1), the rational case. In this sense, the 
salient thinking model encompasses the rational one, which is a special 
case. Passengers are all identical for model tractability. 
With preferences given by (1) and two transport alternatives, a 
rational passenger will choose to travel with operator 1 if v1   P1 > v2  
P2. Suppose that operator 1 has higher quality and a higher fare than 2, 
then this condition is v1   v2P1   P2 > 1. The more expensive service is chosen if 
Fig. 1. The salience function.  
13 The salience function is a mathematical representation of the Weber- 
Fechner law (see Nielsen, Sebald, & Sørensen, 2018). Weber’s principle states 
that the perception of the difference in magnitudes of two stimuli is measured 
by the ratio of the large one to the small. Fechnerian sensitivity implies that 
changes in stimuli are perceived with diminishing sensitivity. See Ellis and 
Masatlioglu (2019) for an axiomatization of the salience function. 
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the difference in net journey value outweighs the mark-up in fare. This 
comparison will not be affected by a common change in the net journey 
values, or fares. Suppose that the building of a new bridge, or better 
facilities for check-in and security control at airports, reduces journey 
time for each operator so that the new net journey value is increased by 
the same amount for each operator, then the difference v1  v2 is unaf-
fected as is demand. Similarly, demand is not changed if both fares in-
crease or decrease by the same amount. 
Suppose now that passengers are salient thinkers and their prefer-
ences are given by (2). If v1   v2P1   P2 >
1
δ, then the difference in quality is high 
compared to the price mark up and the salient thinker prefers service 1. 
Similarly, if δ > v1   v2P1   P2, then the salient passenger prefers service 2. In 
both of these cases, the choices of the rational passenger and the salient 
thinking one coincide. For intermediate values, δ < v1   v2P1   P2 <
1
δ, then the 
choice made by the salient thinker depends upon which attribute that is 
salient, and the choice may diverge from the rational passenger. Bordalo 
et al. (2013) show that homogeneity of the salience function implies that 
the salience of attributes is determined by the ratio of the net journey 
quality to fare ratio. In our case above, net journey value (fare) is salient 
if v1P1 > ð<Þ
v2
P2; the passenger chooses the service that has the highest net 
journey value to fare. In stark contrast to the rational case above, a 
common fare change or change in net journey value can lead consumers 
to shift demand from one service to the other. Suppose for example that 
the government imposes a seat levy of L on all airlines, increasing both 
fares to ePi ¼ Piþ L. It was established above that this does not affect the 
decision of a rational passenger. However, this common fare increase 
can change the salience ranking across attributes, which will cause a 
demand shift in a salient thinking passenger. Suppose initially that fare 
is salient, i.e. v2P2 >
v1
P1; after the introduction of a common seat levy, 




which can occur if L > v2P1   v1P2v1   v2 . A large 
enough fare increase makes passengers less sensitive to this attribute by 
diminishing sensitivity, and a salient thinking passenger can shift de-
mand to the more expensive, high quality service even though both have 
experienced the same rise in fare. A shift in demand can also result from 
a common reduction in journey time mentioned above. Dertwinkel-Kalt, 
K€okler, Lange, and Wenzel (2016) test this property from salience theory 
in a laboratory setting, finding strong support for the phenomenon. 
A further implication of the Bordalo et al. (2013) theory of consumer 
choice is that expanding the choice set may change the salience ranking. 
Ariely (2008) presented MBA students with two types of subscription for 
The Economist magazine: 1. A web subscription for $59 and 2. A print 
and web subscription for $125. Faced with these options, 32% chose 
option 2. Then a third option was introduced: 3. Print subscription for 
$125. This is clearly a dominated offer, and should not change the 
choices of rational decision makers. However, faced with three options, 
84% now chose option 2. Option 3 is a decoy product which plays no 
role in rational decision making, but which can be used to change 
consumers’ saliency ranking in the theory of Bordalo et al. (2013) since 
it changes the reference point from which salience is measured.14 An 
airline will often offer an economy ticket, a more expensive premium 
package, and an economy plus ticket close in price to the premium 
package. In choosing between the economy and premium package, the 
large fare difference may catch the attention of passengers. Adding the 
intermediate option can make the passenger focus less on price, and 
more on the high quality of the premium deal, making it seem like a 
good option compared with the slightly cheaper economy plus ticket. 
Another manifestation of this is the compromise effect first discussed by 
Simonson (1989). The case of airline internet provision mentioned in the 
Introduction is an example of this; faced with basic and premium 
coverage, many passengers may resort to the cheap option. Adding an 
intermediate option may be seen by consumers as a compromise, 
making them willing to pay more for higher quality, even though they 
still do not choose the most expensive option. 
We now consider how salient thinking passengers affect competition 
between transport operators. 
3. Competitive fare setting 
Transport operators compete by setting fares, given passengers’ 
perceived utility represented by (2) and the cost of providing the ser-
vices. Suppose that a train operator and a bus company compete to take 
passengers between two towns, and that the journey time is shorter by 
train (i.e. a larger net journey value for the passenger from train trans-
port). Hence, one can surmise that the train company will want to set its 
fare quite close to the bus company in order to highlight the difference in 
net journey value from the two transport modes. The bus company, on 
the other hand will try to set its price a good deal lower than the train 
fare in order to distract the consumers’ attention from the difference in 
net journey value. Intuitively, each operator wants their favoured 
attribute to grab the attention of the passengers. 
To translate the preferences of passengers in (2) to a demand func-
tion, we assume that total demand is given by measure one. Since all 
passengers are identical, they will choose the mode of transport that 
gives them the most utility in (2). Demand for operator i’s service will 
depend upon net journey values and fares also of the rival j: diðvi;Pi; vj;
PjÞ, with dj ¼ 1   di and i 6¼ j ¼ 1; 2. Suppose that USðvi; PiÞ ¼ USðvj;PjÞ
and that Pi > ci; Pj ¼ cj. Then operator i is the only operator that can 
reduce its fare, and still make a profit, and an infinitesimal reduction in 
i’s fare will allow it to capture the whole market: di ¼ 1; dj ¼ 0. 
Given the demand function, each operator sets its fare in order to 
maximize profit given by πi ¼ diðPi   ciÞ. As in Bordalo et al. (2016), it is 
instructive to start with the rational case (δ ¼ 1) as a benchmark, before 
going on to analyse the role of salient thinking. Suppose that operator 1 
gives the consumer the weakly largest net journey value (v1 � v2) at a 
weakly higher cost (c1 � c2), and furthermore that v1   c1 > v2   c2 so 
that operator 1 creates the largest surplus. Then this operator can always 
undercut the fare of the rival in order to capture the whole market; 
hence, operator 2 can do no better than setting its fare equal to its 
production cost, earning a profit of zero. Operator 1 will then set its own 
fare in order to ensure that a rational consumer is just indifferent be-
tween the two services15: v1   P1 ¼ v2   c2 which gives P1 ¼ c2 þ ðv1  
v2Þ. Operator 1 sets its fare at a premium above the fare of 2 with the 
premium given by the utility difference between the two services. 
Operator 1 serves the whole market in equilibrium, making a positive 
profit of π1 ¼ ðv1   c1Þ   ðv2   c2Þ. In the case that v1   c1 < v2   c2, 
then it is operator 2 that provides the largest surplus (in spite of the fact 
that operator 1 gives weakly most net journey value). Then P1 ¼ c1;
P2 ¼ c1   ðv1   v2Þ; π1 ¼ 0; π2 ¼ ðv2   c2Þ   ðv1   c1Þ. Here, operator 
2 prices below the cost of the rival, capturing the whole market. Finally, 
when both operators produce the same surplus, we have the standard 
Bertrand case under symmetry where each can do no better than set fare 
equal to own production cost, serving half the market each, and making 
zero profits. 
With the assumptions made on the salience function, net journey 
value or fare will be salient for both transport services, and Bordalo et al. 







Here, the net journey value provided by each operator is furthest 
away from the reference point, so that this is the attribute that stands 
14 Herwig et al. (2018) give a good account of the mechanism here. 
15 By an argument similar to that of Bertrand competition, operator 1 sets its 
fare infinitesimally under this level to capture the whole market.  
16 This is easily verified by using the symmetric salience function introduced 
earlier. 
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out. Suppose that v1 > v2; P1 > P2, so that the operator providing the 
highest net journey value also sets the highest fare. If operator 1 then 
reduces its fare sufficiently, price becomes less salient, and attention is 
drawn to the high net journey value of its own service. On the other 
hand, if 2 reduces its fare, then this makes fare more salient and pas-
sengers’ attention is more likely to be drawn to the high fare charged by 
1. Hence, each operator can use the fare-setting decision to draw 
attention to the attribute on which its scores most favourably with 
passengers. Bordalo et al. (2016) call this an “attention externality”. 
Suppose then that passengers gain greater net journey value from 
travelling with operator 1: v1 > v2, and that operator 2 has set a fare of 
P2. The pricing problem for 1 is to set as high a fare as possible given the 
constraints that passengers regard net journey value as salient 
(inequality (5) below) and prefer the service of operator 1 (inequality 
(4) below). Using equation (2), the problem is written 
maxP1   c1  
s.t. 







Fig. 2 represents the choice problem, in which the lower envelope of 
constraints (4) and (5) determines the fare of operator 1 given that it 
covers cost. When 2 sets its fare at P’2 then constraint (5) binds, and 
setting a fare above P’1 would mean that net journey value would no 
longer be salient. When 2 sets its fare at P’’2 then it is (4) that binds, and 
setting a price above P’’1 would mean that passengers would prefer the 
service of the rival 2. The dashed line in the figure shows how fare would 
be set with fully rational passengers. Note that the high provider of net 
journey value often sets a fare with salient customers above the one that 
would be set in the rational case; only if P2 is set very low, would the fare 
decision of operator 1 be below the rational level indicated by the 
dashed line in Fig. 2. 
For operator 2 that gives the lowest net journey value, the fare- 
setting decision is designed in order to make price the salient feature: 
maxP2   c2  
s.t. 







The constraint in (7) ensures that passengers regard price as the 
salient feature, and given this, (6) implies that they gain more utility 
from this service than that of the rival. 
Which attribute is salient depends upon the net journey value to cost 
ratio of the services. When v1c1 >
v2
c2, then the higher net journey value of 
operator 1 is salient since it can set a sufficiently low fare to make this 
the case. Operator 2 cannot follow this low fare without making a loss, 
making it a non-optimal choice. On the other hand, v1c1 <
v2
c2 implies that 
operator 2 – providing lower net journey value – can set a fare suffi-
ciently low to make the fare attribute salient, and this cannot be 
matched by operator 1 without making a loss. It is convenient to allow 
salience to fully determine the decision of the passengers, and Bordalo 
et al. (2016) assume that 
1
δ
ðc1   c2Þ> v1   v2 > δðc1   c2Þ: (8) 
Assuming (8) means that when net journey value is salient, equation 
(4) is automatically fulfilled, and that when fare is salient then (6) is 
fulfilled. With this, the equilibrium of stage 2 (the fare-setting stage) can 
be stated directly: 
Proposition 1. (Bordalo et al., 2016). 
With (8) satisfied, and for any parameter values δ 2 ½0; 1�, and v1 � v2;
c1 � c2, the following fares are optimal:  
(i) if v1c1 >
v2




δ ðv1   v2Þ
�
; P2 ¼ c2. Net 
journey value is salient, demand is d1 ¼ 1, and operator 1 makes 
positive profits.  
(ii) if v1c1 <
v2
c2, fares are P1 ¼ c1; P2 ¼ min
�
v2c1v1; c1   δðv1   v2Þ
�
. 
Fare is salient, demand is d2 ¼ 1, and operator 2 makes positive 
profits.  
(iii) if v1c1 ¼
v2
c2, fares are P1 ¼ c1; P2 ¼ c2. Net journey value and fare are 
equally salient, demand is di ¼ 1, if vi   ci > vj   cj and d1 ¼ d2 ¼ 12 
if v1   c1 ¼ v2   c2. Both operators make zero profits. 
The operator that manages to make the attribute salient in which it 
has an advantage captures the whole market here. Operator 1 with the 
higher net journey value wants to make this the salient feature of pas-
sengers’ choices, and prices the service accordingly. Operator 2 provides 
a lower net journey value, and wants fare to be salient for passengers. 
Which attribute is salient depends upon the cost per unit net journey 
value ratios of the two services since cjvj >
ci
vi implies that operator i can set 
the fare in order to make its advantage salient. In part (i) of Proposition 
1, this is the case for operator 1. To find the optimal fare for 1, we can 
refer to Fig. 2, setting P2 ¼ c2, and then reading off the optimal fare from 
the locus indicated in bold. 
As a description of price competition in a transport market, this model is 
not particularly satisfactory since it predicts that only one operator will serve 
the market except in the unlikely case depicted in Proposition 1 (iii). In this 
sense, the model can be deemed similar to the Bertrand model of competition 
with homogeneous products; this could be the outcome of strictly regulated 
markets where operators compete to become the only one given a traffic li-
cense by the authorities. On the other hand, the model draws attention to the 
fact that operators think strategically in terms of which attribute of a service it 
wishes to emphasize. As Fig. 2 indicates, this will usually tend to increase the 
fare choice of a provider of high net journey value when passengers place 
sufficient weight on this attribute. This prediction may be sensible for a 
transport market. The simplicity of the price competition model also allows Fig. 2. Optimal fare response of operator 1, ensuring that net journey value is salient. 
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interesting predictions involving quality choices made by operators as elab-
orated on in the next section.17 
4. Introducing quality of transport services 
4.1. Augmenting journey quality 
In a transport market, the net value of a journey to a passenger can be 
affected by different dimensions of journey quality that influence the 
inconvenience of making the trip. These may relate to comfort or safety, 
or can involve speedy check-in procedures or free food or beverages. Let 
us denote the quality augmented net value of a journey with operator i 
by Vi ¼ vi þ qi where qi � 0 is journey quality, coming at a cost of kiðqiÞ, 
which is an increasing convex function with kið0Þ ¼ 0. Hence the total 
cost of providing service i consists of the unit cost and quality cost: Ci ¼
ciþ kiðqiÞ. With these cost and journey utility definitions, assuming that 
(8) holds for ðVi;CiÞ, then the result from the fare-setting subgame is still 
given by Proposition 1; here ðvi; ciÞ are replaced by ðVi;CiÞ. Suppose that 
we are initially in a situation in which V1C1 ¼
V2
C2 so that Proposition 1 (iii) 
indicates that both services are priced at cost and neither operator makes 
a positive profit. If operator 1 can increase quality proportionately more 
than this increases cost so that V1C1 increases, then Proposition 1 (i) in-
dicates that net journey value (now given by the quality augmented 
measure Vi) becomes salient and operator 2 can do no better than price 
at cost, whilst operator 1 now makes a positive profit. In such a situation, 
operator 1 has an incentive to increase the quality of its service. On the 
other hand, if the increase in quality costs proportionately more than the 
increase in net journey value, then V1C1 will fall and Proposition 1 (ii) 
shows that fare will now be salient and the lower quality provider will 
set fare in order to exploit this, drawing attention to the high fare of 
service 1. Operator 2 will earn positive profits in this case. It should be 
clear that each operator faces this dilemma when determining the 
optimal level of quality. We now look at how quality choices are made, 
first by symmetric operators, and then for the case of asymmetry. 
4.2. Symmetric operators 
Suppose that we introduce a stage at which the operators set their 
quality simultaneously at stage 1 and then at stage 2 set fares. To 
determine the level of quality chosen by the operators, consider first the 
symmetric, rational case in which v1 ¼ v2 ¼ v; c1 ¼ c2 ¼ c; k1ðqÞ ¼
k2ðqÞ ¼ kðqÞ; δ ¼ 1. Bordalo et al. (2016) show in this case that the 
operators set quality at the rationally optimal level, q*; in order to 
maximize surplus vþ q   c   kðqÞ, implying k’ðq*Þ ¼ 1, with fares set at 
cost P1 ¼ P2 ¼ cþ kðq*Þ, sharing the market equally. This is a standard 
result in which the quality chosen is determined purely by the condition 
that the marginal cost of a quality increase is equal to the increment in 
utility. Chosen quality is hence independent of the unit cost c and the 
initial net journey value v. 
Retaining the case of symmetry, but now assuming salient thinkers 
(δ < 1), we can consider the incentives to raise quality. As discussed 
above, from a symmetric situation, it can be profitable for an operator to 
increase quality if this increases ViCi, making net journey value the salient 








cþ kðqiÞ   ðvþ qiÞk’ðqiÞ
ðcþ kðqiÞÞ2
(9) 
It is immediate that (9) is increasing if 
cþ kðqiÞ
vþ qi
> k’ðqiÞ: (10) 
The left-hand-side of (10) is the average cost per unit of net journey 
value, whilst the right-hand side is the marginal cost of quality. If (10) 
holds at the rational equilibrium (qi ¼ q*), then an operator may find it 
profitable to increase quality from this point as long as average cost is 
larger than marginal cost. This implies that a deviation from first-best 
quality may be optimal, and quality can be oversupplied. Intuitively, 
an increase in quality adds little to cost, so that fare will not increase 
much. Salient thinkers will focus on the quality increase allowing this 
operator to capture the market. If, on the other hand, the inequality in 
(10) is reversed at the rational equilibrium then it can be profitable to 
reduce quality from the first-best level. Such a reduction leads to a large 
cost saving, so that the fall in quality can be outweighed by a large drop 
in fare. Salient thinkers focus on fare, and quality is undersupplied in 
relation to the first-best outcome. 
The fact that passengers are salient thinkers implies that operators 
will have an incentive to deviate from the quality level that would be 
chosen when passengers are rational. The temptation to exploit the 
salient thinking of the passengers lies in the fact that adjusting quality 
changes the net journey value-to-cost ratio. When we reach a point at 
which changing quality no longer affects this ratio, the temptation dis-
appears and we have an equilibrium level of quality. This occurs when 
(10) becomes an equality, so that the average cost per unit of net journey 
value equals the marginal cost of quality provision, i.e. for bq where 
cþ kðbqÞ
vþ bq
¼ k’ðbqÞ: (11) 
Equation (11) defines the optimal quality as bqðc;vÞ. There is a clear 
deviation in the optimal quality when passengers are salient thinkers as 
compared to the rational case since quality now depends upon both the 
unit cost of the service and the initial net value from undertaking a 
journey, v; the rational quality choice simply solves k’ðq*Þ ¼ 1 as noted 
previously. Note that the optimal level of quality defined in (11) is that 
which minimizes the average cost per unit of quality augmented net 
journey value ( vþqcþkðqÞ), giving operators a simple rule for optimal quality 











< 0: (12) 
The higher the unit cost of the service, the more quality that is 
supplied by the operators, who want passengers to focus on this attribute 
rather than the high fare necessitated by high costs. Hence, airlines will 
offer visible add-ons such as seating with extra leg room, food and 
beverages, free wi-fi, priority boarding etc. Services that have a low unit 
cost will have a low level of quality since operators in this case want 
passengers to focus on the low fare. When the net value of a journey 
without quality add-ons is already high – in our case due to a short 
journey time – operators will not invest in so much quality since they 
want the low price of the short journey to be salient. Long journeys, with 
low net journey value, will have a higher quality service in order to 
improve the standing of the services with salient thinking passengers. 
There is a maximal quality level, above which bqðc; vÞ will no longer 
be the optimal choice for operators; they will not wish to increase 
quality above the level that maximizes the total surplus when quality is 
salient. This level is such that ðvþqÞ   ​ δðcþkðqÞÞ is maximized; denote 
this by q where k’ðqÞ ¼ 1δ. In addition, quality will not be supplied below 
the level q that maximizes total surplus when price is salient δðv þ qÞ  
ðc þ kðqÞÞ, i.e. where k’ðqÞ ¼ δ. 
4.2.1. An example 
Suppose that the cost of quality is given by the specification kðqÞ ¼
17 Section 5 also presents a version of the model with continuous demand so 
that both operators may coexist in the market. 
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Kq2
2 where K > 0 is constant. Then we can use Bordalo et al. (2016),
18 to 
































þ δv � c > c
(13)  
where the bounds ensure that q > q* > q. The symmetric choice of 
quality when facing salient thinking passengers is illustrated in Fig. 3. In 
this symmetric equilibrium, both operators set fares at cost P1 ¼ P2 ¼
cþ kðqSÞ, and share the market equally. 
As the operators and their services are identical in this equilibrium, 
operators price at cost and share the market equally. Several features of 
the equilibrium are noteworthy, however. As noted above, there is a 
positive relationship between unit operating costs and the provision of 
quality for some cost levels. Two low cost operators who compete 
against each other (e.g. Ryanair and Easy Jet) will hence provide low 
quality; low costs lead to low fares and fare becomes salient, so that the 
low quality draws attention to the low fare. If the competitors have 
higher unit costs (e.g. British Airways and Lufthansa), then they will 
offer quality upgrades to passengers in order to draw attention away 
from the fact that they must charge a high fare to cover operating costs. 
In Fig. 3, note that the upper bounds for the quality choice do not 
depend on the initial net journey value v, and that the level of quality in 
the first-best rational case is constant for all values of unit cost c. The 
choice of quality between the upper and lower bounds is dependent on 
initial net journey value, however, and two examples are drawn in Fig. 3 
for v ¼ v0 and v ¼ v0 þ Δ; Δ > 0. In both cases, quality is an increasing 
function of the unit cost, and we can see that for high enough levels of c, 
quality is oversupplied in relation to first-best, and for sufficiently low 
levels of unit cost it is undersupplied; for initial net journey value v0, c >
ð<Þbcðv0Þ implies oversupply (undersupply) of quality in relation to the 
rational equilibrium. Fig. 3 also illustrates the point made above that 
quality is decreasing in the initial net journey value since bqðc; v0 þΔÞ lies 
below bqðc; v0Þ. As initial net journey value increases, it is also the case 
that the range of unit costs increases for which quality is undersupplied 
in relation to first-best. This follows since bqðc; v0 þΔÞ lies to the right of 
bqðc; v0Þ, so that unit costs between the two curves face undersupply of 
quality with the higher initial net journey value, whilst they lead to 
oversupply when initial journey value is lower. Note also that the degree 
to which the salient passengers overweigh the salient attribute (δ) affects 
only the upper and lower bounds for quality, not the optimally provided 
level for the operators. The larger is this parameter, the smaller the 
spread of quality around the rational, first-best level. Hence, transport 
operators do not need to know the exact degree of “irrationality” of its 
passengers in making its optimal quality choice, given that this is within 
the upper and lower bounds. 
4.3. Implications for policymakers 
Suppose that a transport regulator wishes to implement a minimum 
level of quality, and based on the usual calculation, ignorant of the fact 
that passengers weight net journey value and fare differently, he then 
sets the rational solution q* as the minimum desired quality level. Fig. 3 
makes clear, however, that this is not optimal for operators for many 
levels of unit cost when one takes account of the fact that passengers in 
the market are salient thinkers. When initial net journey value is v0, 
operators with a cost below bcðv0Þ must increase quality above the 
optimal level; this could be interpreted as a penalty to efficient running 
of the service, since high cost operators (above bcðv0Þ) will not be affected 
by the minimum quality standard. Fig. 3 also illustrates what can happen 
if the regulator decides to give a subsidy to the running of the service, 
effectively reducing the unit cost c. Where quality is provided at the 
lower bound, this will have no effect on the level of quality supplied. 
Otherwise, the subsidy will lead to (weakly) lower levels of quality. 
When the unit cost is lower, fare becomes more salient, and quality falls 
in order to draw attention to the lower fare. On the other hand, imple-
menting regulation that increases the unit cost (such as an extra 
congestion tax on busses, or landing fee on aircraft), will lead to weakly 
more quality being offered by the operators. Fares must increase due to 
the cost rise, making quality augmented net journey value more salient. 
Quality provision increases to draw attention to this attribute and away 
from the higher fare. 
When the marginal cost of providing quality decreases, then the 
rational, first-best level of quality increases. This is also true for the case 
of salient thinking passengers. Using the parameterized example in (13), 
a decrease in K will cause a larger increase in quality provided when 
passengers are salient thinkers compared to the rational case when 




K ; it can readily be established that this level of unit cost 
is higher than that at which q* ¼ bqðc;vÞ, illustrated as bcðv0Þ in Fig. 3 for 
initial net journey value v0. Hence, the increase in quality with salient 
thinking passengers is larger than in the rational case as long at quality is 
sufficiently overprovided before the reduction in the marginal cost of 
quality. 
4.4. Asymmetric cost of quality provision 
From the symmetric equilibrium that underlies (13), it is possible to 
ask what would happen if one of the operators – say 1 – has a lower cost 
of providing quality than the rival. Suppose that the cost of providing 
quality for operator 1 is now k1ðq1Þ ¼
K1q21
2 ; K1 < K. Bordalo et al. (2016) 
show that in the new equilibrium that operator 2 can do no better than 
retaining the level of quality established in (13). Operator 1 will always 
be able to capture the whole market now since it can provide the same 
level of quality as the rival at a lower cost, which in turn means that it 
can charge a lower fare and service all customers. Given the assumption 
that operator 2 with high cost does not change its quality level, Fig. 4 
illustrates the quality choice of operator 1. The high cost operator earns 
zero in this equilibrium, and cannot do better by choosing another level 
of quality, rendering the quality in (13) a best response, and indicated by 
Fig. 3. Optimal choice of quality in the symmetric case.  
18 Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 in Bordalo et al. (2016). 
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qS in Fig. 4. 
















if c > c
K
K1
qS if c 2 ½c; c�
2Kcþ δ2
2K1ðvK þ δÞ








Whilst it is clearly the case that the lower cost operator will provide 
more quality for sufficiently high unit cost of provision (c � c), this is not 
necessarily true for c < c. The first two lines in (14) make clear that 
quality increases for very high and intermediate levels of the unit cost, 
and for these intermediate levels, quality of 1 is a fixed multiple of that 
of the higher cost rival. For these intermediate unit cost levels, the 
quality provided by 1 is an increasing concave function of unit cost. For 
low levels of the unit cost, the third line in (14) indicates that the quality 





as indicated by the third line in (14). In other words, if the new marginal 
cost of quality for operator 1 is sufficiently small then q*1ðK1Þ > qS for all 
levels of the unit cost. The more efficient provider of quality increases 
quality enough to make net journey value the salient attribute for pas-
sengers, and the low cost means that this does not involve a large price 
hike. This is the situation depicted in Fig. 4. When (15) is not fulfilled, 
and the marginal cost reduction is modest, then the lower cost provider 
of quality keeps the same level of quality as before (δK), as indicated at the 






, i.e. the same price as before the cost decrease. Since operator 1 
has lower cost, it can set its fare slightly below this level so that it serves 
the whole market, making a positive profit. 
These results stand in stark contrast to those that occur if passengers 
are fully rational (δ ¼ 1). In this case, the quality provided by the op-
erators would maximize surplus so that q*1ðδ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1K1 > q
*
2ðδ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1K 
with quadratic costs of quality provision. Hence, operator 2 keeps 
quality at the same level, whilst that of 1 is increased. The level of 
quality does not depend on the initial net journey value or the unit cost 
of the service. Assuming that passengers are salient thinkers gives a link 
between the provision of quality, the unit cost of service provision, and 
the initial net journey value. 
5. Continuous demand 
As noted previously, the fare-setting model is not completely satis-
factory for modelling a transport market since it precludes the coexis-
tence of both operators; one operator would – according to the model – 
usually evolve to be a monopoly. This was a feature of the standard 
Bertrand pricing model for homogeneous products that was changed by 
assuming continuous demand for horizontally differentiated products 
(Singh & Vives, 1984). Similarly, Bordalo et al. (2016) show that their 
model can be adapted to a continuous demand framework.19 Rather 
than assuming that products are different, they introduce the notion that 
different consumers can have different perceptions of salience, i.e. some 
may focus more on quality differences than others. Formally, the het-
erogeneity in salience perception is modelled stochastically, where the 
difference in randomness between consumers is distributed as a logistic 
function.20 This gives rise to a version of the multinomial logit demand 
function first introduced by McFadden (1973). Bordalo et al. (2016) 
show that the market of size one will be divided by operators depending 



















β ZðrP   rV Þ
(16)  
where Z ¼ 2
ðrVþ1ÞðrPþ1Þ , and β > 0 is the scale parameter of the distribu-
tion underlying the randomness in salience. It is straightforward to 
verify that operator 1 has the larger demand for its service if net journey 
value is salient ðrV > rPÞ. When 1β is low then the difference in the ratio of 
fares and net journey values (i.e. salience) plays little role in passengers’ 
choice of service; when 1β is large, then deviations from equal salience 
has a large effect on demand, giving scope to the operators to adjust their 
net journey value-to-fare ratios in order to capture a larger share of the 
market. At the fare-setting stage, each operator maximizes profit 
DiðPi   CiÞ; i ¼ 1; 2 for a fixed level of quality. As in the previous section, 
we simplify to the symmetric case in order to analyse the optimal choice 
of quality for the operators. The decision facing operator 1 is then to 








β ZðrP   rV Þ
ðrP þ 1Þ2
D1¼ 1: (17) 







The solution requires of course 1β > 4 so that passengers are suffi-
ciently sensitive to differences in the net journey value-to-fare ratio. If 
they are infinitely sensitive to these differences ðβ →0Þ, then the fare is 
equal to cost as in the Bertrand model. Turning to the quality determi-
nation stage, (18) can be rewritten to depend upon the quality chosen 






: (19)  
With quality choices qi, we can write rP ¼ cþkðq1Þcþkðq2Þ; rV ¼
vþq1
vþq2 and operator 
Fig. 4. Effect on quality of a cost reduction for operator 1.  
19 This is demonstrated in the online appendix accompanying their paper.  
20 The random component of salience is modelled as a Gumbel distribution, 
and the difference between two random variables distributed accordingly has a 
logistic distribution. 
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1 chooses quality to maximize 
D1ðPðq1Þ   c   kðq1ÞÞ: (20) 
Differentiating (20) with respect to q1, and evaluating the first 
order condition at a symmetric situation (rP ¼ rV ¼ 1; D1 ¼ D2 ¼ 12:







This result echoes that found previously in equation (11). Indeed, 
when passengers are infinitely sensitive to differences in the net journey 
value and fare ratios (β→0), then (11) and (21) are identical. Taking the 
case of quadratic quality costs, as β increases towards one, the curve 
depicted in Fig. 3 moves up, and more quality will be provided for each 
level of unit cost. As in the previous section, quality provision is 
increasing in the unit cost, in contrast to the rational case in which it is 
constant. Hence, the case with continuous demand depicts qualitatively 
the same situation as before, but now both operators serve the market 
(with identical market shares in the symmetric case). 
6. Implications for transport markets 
As acknowledged by Metcalfe and Dolan (2012), transport econo-
mists have started to consider behavioural analysis as an framework for 
passenger decision making. Saliency theory is one possibility that we 
have expanded on, and which has for example been suggested as one 
way of informing decisions in the design of taxes (Schenk, 2011), or to 
improve dietary choices by directing attention towards the healthiness 
of foods (Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011). Policymakers in transport 
markets have directed attention to behavioural analysis (Department for 
Transport, 2011), and several travel-related companies (e.g. Amadeus 
and Seatfrog) consider the possibility that passengers make decisions 
based on heuristics rather than as the result of complex rational utility 
maximization. The implications of saliency theory for transport markets 
follow from i) the predictions emanating from the preference structure 
and ii) operators’ fare and quality choices based on salient preferences. 
In Section 2, we noted that a salient thinking passenger will make 
choices according to the value of the net journey value to fare ratio. If 
this is higher for the high quality operator then the highest quality 
service is chosen; if the low quality operator has the higher net journey 
value to fare ratio, then the passenger chooses the cheapest service. A 
salient thinking passenger will tend to make extreme choices (highest 
quality or lowest price, depending on which attribute is salient). One 
possible test of whether passengers are salient thinkers would be to 
compare competing services by calculating their net journey value to 
fare ratios, expecting those with the largest values to have a large market 
share. The framework in Section 2 can also be used by a single operator 
who is considering different ticket categories. A train operator with a 
monopoly on a service might attempt to differentiate between consumer 
groups with respect to fare and net journey value combinations. Adrian 
(2019) shows, however, that the operator would be less prone to treating 
consumer groups differently when they are salient thinkers as compared 
to the rational version of price discrimination. 
Saliency theory explains two phenomena that are at odds with 
rational preferences, as noted in Section 2. First, a common change in 
fare or net journey value will not affect the choice decision of a rational 
passenger. However, such a change can affect the saliency ranking of the 
attributes, leading to a shift in demand from one service to another. A 
further test of the theory would then be to examine the responses of 
passengers on competing services before and after common changes to 
the services. The introduction of a (sufficiently large) seat surcharge on 
airlines will be expected to increase demand of higher quality services 
relative to low, according to the theory.21 This demand shift phenom-
enon is interesting from a policy point of view, since one may consider 
that a common surcharge imposed on transport operators will not 
change the nature of competition between them since passengers 
rationally calculate that the fare differential is unchanged. However, the 
change may disproportionally harm providers of low net journey value 
due to the demand-shifting effect; their competitive response – accord-
ing to the model in Section 3 – could then be to cut fares in order to again 
make this the salient attribute for customers.22 Similarly, competition 
between services may be affected by the provision of a common infra-
structure (a new train track, or new bridge for bus traffic) which reduces 
journey time equally for the services. This general increase in net 
journey value makes this attribute less salient, and could lead to pas-
sengers switching to the lowest fare alternative. 
Consider now passengers’ reaction to a policy that affects one of the 
providers in the market. Suppose that a pollution tax is imposed on a 
diesel bus that serves a route between towns A and B, but this is not 
imposed on an electric tram service. To the extent that the tax increases 
fare, a rational response would be for some passengers to substitute to 
the relatively cheaper service. A salient thinker will not necessarily 
change decision, however, if the salient attribute is the same before and 
after the tax; the competitive response of the operator can contribute to 
this. 
Net journey value can be affected by the operators (through quality 
enhancements for example), by infrastructure providers, or by policy 
decisions of the transport authority. The novelty in the salient thinking 
approach is that the decision of the operators to augment quality will 
depend on the unit cost of providing the service. This is a testable 
implication of the theory – high cost operators should invest more in 
quality provision than low cost (British Airways vs Ryanair). According 
to the theory, operators would tend to reduce quality investments the 
higher the initial net journey value. If an airport provides check-in and 
security facilities that save passengers’ journey time, the salient 
response of airlines would be to reduce investments in the quality of the 
service. Reducing the landing fees of an airline, making the cost of 
providing the service lower, will tend to increase quality investments by 
the airline. In both cases, the quality optimal choice will not be affected 
if passengers are purely rational. 
7. Conclusion 
Consumers have limited cognitive ability to take account all facets of 
a decision, and substantial experimental evidence suggests that we make 
relative comparisons that are context-specific rather than just absolute 
ones that underlie the rational utility model. This gives rise to the pos-
sibility that an attribute of a product may stand out by being further 
away from a reference point than others. This attribute is then salient in 
the decision of consumers, and receives more weight in the utility 
function than rationality would dictate. This gives producers the scope 
to adjust the attributes of their products in order to capture a larger 
share of the market, by making the attribute in which it has an advan-
tage salient for consumers. 
We have adapted a model of choice under salient thinking to a simple 
transport market consisting of two operators who provide services that 
can differ in terms of quality and fare. Initial net journey value can 
depend upon the goal and process utility of the trip as well as its dura-
tion; this basic journey has a fixed unit cost to provide. The net value of a 
journey can be enhanced by the providers’ investing in costly quality 
21 Finding evidence of this provides indirect support for the theory, without of 
course establishing that passengers are salient thinkers.  
22 A complicating effect here is that the pass-on rate (the degree to which firms 
pass on changes in taxes to passengers) depends on market structure (see e.g. 
Jørgensen & Santos, 2014). 
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improvements. When consumers are rational, they put equal weight on 
fare and quality in their utility function, and the optimal amount of 
quality to supply maximizes total surplus. This gives an optimal quality 
enhancement that is constant, and does not vary with the unit cost of 
journey provision. When passengers are salient thinkers, then the ratio 
of the operators’ provided net journey value to journey cost is an 
important variable. When the net journey value provided by operator i is 
greater than operator j, and i has the higher value/cost ratio, then this 
operator can set its fare low enough such that this attribute does not 
stand out between the operators; passengers are thus drawn to the 
higher quality of operator i. Operator j may be tempted to lower fare in 
order to draw attention back to the higher fare of the rival, but cannot do 
so without making a loss due to the asymmetry in value/cost ratio. Such 
considerations are not present in traditional models of fare setting, but 
are an important consideration when passengers are drawn to salient 
attributes of a transport service. We have demonstrated in the discussion 
around Fig. 2 that fares will generally be higher when passengers are 
salient thinkers; the exception is for journeys with low unit costs, where 
the temptation to make price salient leads to hard competition. 
Similar implications follow from the quality decision made by op-
erators. Enhancements of quality that increase the net journey value/ 
cost ratio of a service put the operator in a position to price in order to 
draw attention to its superior quality as suggested above. An operator 
can secure an increase in the net journey value/cost ratio if the average 
cost of a quality improvement is greater than the marginal cost; such 
operators are candidates to increase quality in order to make this a 
salient attribute for passengers. The simple case of symmetric operators 
is instructive for comparing the salient thinking model to the rational 
one. We show that the type of equilibrium achieved depends upon the 
unit cost of provision of the service. When this is low the equilibrium is 
such that quality is undersupplied relative to the rational level, and 
operators compete by setting low fares (fare-salient equilibrium); for 
high unit costs of provision, operators oversupply quality in order to 
make passengers focus on this attribute since the fare must be high to 
cover costs (quality-salient equilibrium). This is consistent with the case 
of airlines discussed in the introduction. Low-cost airlines that compete 
against each other will supply a low level of quality enhancement in 
order to make passengers focus on price. Full-service airlines that 
compete against each other have high costs of journey provision and 
cannot hence charge a low fare. Their response is to enhance quality to 
make this the feature on which passengers focus, oversupplying quality 
in relation to the level required by rational passengers. Quality en-
hancements by airlines are often very visible such as speedy check-in, 
fast security pass through, free food and drink on board, more leg 
room, luxurious cabin etc. A simple condition is revealed by the model 
for determining the optimal level of quality enhancement, since it is the 
level that minimizes the average cost per unit of quality augmented net 
journey value. The symmetric model also suggests that the amount of 
quality enhancement is decreasing in the initial level of the net journey 
value; operators that provide a journey that already gives passengers a 
high net value will not invest as much in quality as operators that pro-
vide a lower initial net journey value. 
When one operator has a cost advantage in providing quality en-
hancements, it will set a high level of quality in order to induce a quality- 
salient equilibrium. In our initial formulation of the model this leads to 
the operator with higher cost of quality being driven out of the market. 
This is akin to the traditional model of Bertrand price competition with 
heterogeneous firms which could be the market solution when operators 
compete for sole rights in regulated markets. As such, the predictions of 
the model may not be deemed relevant for deregulated transport mar-
kets in which we observe co-existence of quite different operators (low- 
cost airlines and full-service airlines compete on the same routes for 
example). The basic model may then be more suited to looking at 
competition between similar operators. Following Bordalo et al. (2016), 
we considered a version of the model that admits continuous demand, 
allowing for the coexistence of heterogeneous operators in the same 
market. The conclusions here are in line with the simple model. The 
more sensitive passengers are to differences in the net journey value/-
fare ratio, the closer the quality level from the simple model we come. 
Central questions in evaluating the analysis in this paper is to what 
degree passengers are actually salient thinkers, and to what extent 
transport providers take this into account in their fare-setting and 
quality decisions. Suppose that a bus and a ferry serve the same stretch A 
to B, with the journey time being lower with the ferry, but at a higher 
fare. If the ferry operator offers a VIP room at a surcharge for some 
customers with free coffee and sandwiches, then traditionally econo-
mists would regard this as a form of price discrimination. An alternative 
explanation could be that the ferry operator is trying to detract attention 
from the high fare by enhancing quality for those passengers who may 
be salient thinkers, and choose the ferry because the quality attribute 
stands out. Other considerations is whether passengers have differences 
in the preferences for salience. Some passengers might avoid the ferry 
completely because they do not want to travel by sea or are afraid of bad 
weather. Possible avenues for future research are then to investigate 
empirically whether passengers are salient thinkers, and to analyse to 
which extent transport service providers take this into account in their 
strategic interactions. 
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